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Note
The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives 
More Compatible With Public Morality
Daniel Reynolds*
INTRODUCTION
The  Recording  Industry  Association  of  America 
(RIAA)’s lawsuit campaign against copyright-infringing file 
sharing  is  controversial.  Many  critics  allege  that  this 
campaign  is  unfair  and paint  the  RIAA as  mean  and  a 
bully. Some critics even claim that the RIAA is subversive 
toward the rights of the public. At the same time, many 
file  sharers  continue  to  violate  the  distribution  and 
reproduction  rights  of  copyright  holders,  record  labels, 
and artists, all who have justified expectations of payment 
for their products.
This  Note  examines  the  RIAA’s  approach  and 
alternative  approaches to the file  sharing problem, and 
proposes  an  integrated,  comprehensive  strategy  for 
dealing  with  the  problem  of  illegal  file  sharing.  Part  I 
provides a background on the RIAA and its opinions, the 
development  of  the  RIAA  lawsuits,  the  public  backlash 
against  these  lawsuits,  and  the  relevant  law.  Part  II 
describes the challenges to be met by any solution to the 
file sharing problem, reviews a series of proposals for their 
strengths and weaknesses, and sets forth a strategy that 
balances the strengths of a number of previous proposals 
against  each  other’s  weaknesses.  This  Note  concludes 
with the assertion that the file sharing problem is solvable 
without wasteful, unpopular lawsuits or major changes to 
the  law,  provided  that  the  music  industry  is  willing  to 
adapt to and take cues from the consuming public.
* © 2008 Daniel Reynolds.
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I. THE RIAA, MUSIC FILE SHARING LITIGATION, PUBLIC 
BACKLASH, AND THE LAW
A. THE RIAA AND ITS OPINIONS ON MUSIC FILE SHARING
The  RIAA  is  a  trade  group,  representing  the  U.  S. 
recording  industry.1 Its  membership  creates, 
manufactures, or distributes an overwhelming majority of 
the  audio  recordings  produced  and  sold  in  the  United 
States.2 Its avowed mission is “to foster a business and 
legal climate that supports and promotes [its] members’ 
creative and financial vitality.”3 To that end, it labors to 
protect intellectual property rights.4
The RIAA’s view of sharing copyrighted music files is, 
some believe, harsh. The RIAA calls this sharing “online 
piracy” and describes it as “the unauthorized uploading of 
a copyrighted sound recording and making it available to 
the  public,  or  downloading  a  sound  recording  from  an 
Internet site, even if the recording isn’t resold.”5 The RIAA 
characterizes sharing copyrighted music files as a kind of 
theft6 and claims that millions of dollars and investment in 
the future of music are both jeopardized by the practice.7
As  part  of  its  work  to  protect  intellectual  property 
rights,  the  RIAA  is  waging  a  “multi-faceted”  campaign 
against “online theft of music.”8 That campaign includes 
offering legal alternatives to music fans, educating music 
fans about intellectual property, and litigating on behalf of 
member companies.9 The RIAA’s stated goal for this multi-
faceted campaign is to protect the industry’s capacity to 
invest in new artists and nurture the development of legal 
online services.10
1 . RIAA,  Who  We  Are,  http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php  (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2008).
2 . Id.
3 . Id.
4 . Id.
5 . RIAA, Piracy: Online, http://riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_ 
selector=piracy_details_online (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
6 . RIAA, Piracy: Online and On the Street, http://riaa.com/physical 
piracy.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
7 . RIAA, supra note 5.
8 . Id.
9 . Id.
10 . RIAA, supra note 6.
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The RIAA devotes a page of its website to setting forth 
its view of copyright law.11 As the RIAA explains, making 
unauthorized copies of audio recordings is stealing.12 To 
make  or  distribute  recordings  illegally  is  to  take 
something  of  value  from  the  copyright  holder  without 
permission.13 Copyright  infringement  carries  with  it 
potential civil and criminal liability.14 The RIAA implies that 
the penalties are likely to be severe.15
The RIAA believes it is easy to break the law. Emailing 
music files to others;  ripping an MP3 from a purchased 
CD,  then  making  the  file  available  over  a  network; 
downloading  music  others  have  made  available  over  a 
network, regardless of whether one offers music in return; 
joining a network for a fee to download or upload music 
without  authorization;  and  sharing  music  without 
authorization  via instant  messaging are all  examples of 
wrongful conduct.16
The RIAA strategy of bringing lawsuits is not without 
foundation.  The  notion  of  “private  attorney  general” 
action,  in  which  private  civil  suits  become  a  tool  for 
teaching obedience to the law is not novel, nor is it devoid 
of  adherents.17 At least one law professor has endorsed 
the  RIAA  litigation  strategy  as  likely  to  promote 
deterrence.18 At least one member of the legal community 
has  endorsed  the  litigation  as  necessary  to  promote 
respect  for  copyright  in  light  of  the  failure  of  moral 
11
1
. RIAA,  The  Law,  http://riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?
content_selector= piracy_online_the_law (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
12 . Id. (“When you make illegal copies of someone’s creative work, 
you are stealing and breaking the law.”)
13 . Id.
14 . Id.
15 . See Id. (“Don’t you have a better way to spend five years and 
$250,000?”).  Penalties  for  a  first-time  offender  can  be  as  high  as 
$250,000 and five years of incarceration. Id. The site does not mention 
how likely  such  a  high  penalty  would  be,  or  what  conditions  would 
prompt  it,  leaving the  impression that  it  might  be  assessed  against 
anyone—even a marginal downloader.
16 . Id.
17 . David  W.  Opderbeck,  Peer-to-Peer  Networks,  Technological 
Evolution,  and Intellectual Property  Reverse Private Attorney General 
Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1685–96 (2005).
18 . Matthew  Sag,  Piracy:  Twelve  Year-Olds,  Grandmothers,  and 
Other Good Targets for the Recording Industry’s File Sharing Litigation, 
4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 155 (2006).
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appeals to halt illegal file sharing.19
B. MUSIC FILE SHARING LITIGATION
The recording industry fired its first shots in the file 
sharing  litigation  war  against  peer-to-peer  (P2P)  file 
sharing networks,  rather than individual  users.  In 2000, 
the  industry  brought  suit  against  Napster,  alleging 
contributory  and  vicarious  violation  of  copyright.20 The 
Ninth  Circuit  ordered  Napster  to  make  sure  that  no 
copyrighted  work  owned  by  the  plaintiffs  would  be 
uploaded  or  downloaded  on  Napster  without  the 
permission of the copyright holders.21
After  the  Napster decision,  file  sharing  changed.  In 
2003, Grokster and StreamCast evaded the judgment that 
befell  Napster.22 They escaped because,  unlike Napster, 
they were not centralized.23 Instead, these services, and 
others like them, allowed users to share files without first 
transferring  information  identifying  the  files  to  a  space 
under the service’s control.24
Eventually,  the  Grokster plaintiffs  prevailed.25 The 
Supreme Court held that “one who distributes a device 
with  the  object  of  promoting  its  use  to  infringe 
copyright . . .  is  liable  for  the  resulting  acts  of 
infringement by third parties.”26 Going to the Grokster URL 
now brings up a page with an ominous warning: “Don’t 
think you can’t get caught. You are not anonymous.”27
19
1
. Stacey M. Lantagne,  The Morality of MP3s:  The Failure of the 
Recording Industry’s Plan of Attack, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 270, 284–
88 (2004).
20
2
. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 
(N.D. Cal. 2000),  aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001).
21 . Id. at 927.
22 . Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer  Studios,  Inc.  v.  Grokster,  Ltd.,  259  F. 
Supp.  2d 1029, 1046 (C.D.  Cal.  2003),  aff’d 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 
2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
23 . Id. at 1039–42.
24 . Id.
25 . Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer  Studios,  Inc.  v.  Grokster,  Ltd.,  545  U.S. 
913 (2005).
26 . Id. at 936–37.
27 . Grokster,  http://www.grokster.com/  (last  visited Oct.  6,  2007). 
After mentioning the Supreme Court’s decision that using Grokster and 
other  services  like  it  to  trade  copyrighted  files  is  illegal,  the  page 
displays the user’s IP address and gives the above message. Id.
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In the meantime, however, the RIAA began targeting 
individual users as part of their strategy against copyright 
infringement.28 In  September  of  2003,  the  RIAA  filed 
lawsuits against 261 individuals it  accused of  uploading 
files in violation of copyright law.29 The recording industry 
has filed about 26,000 file sharing suits since 2003.30
On  his  blog,  Recording  Industry  vs  The  People, 
attorney Ray Beckerman,  who has defended individuals 
against the RIAA, documents the process the RIAA uses to 
prosecute  its  lawsuits.31 Although  the  suits  are  often 
described as  being against  “downloaders,”  that  label  is 
misleading. The RIAA does not know if there has been any 
downloading when it starts a suit.32 As Beckerman states, 
“[i]t  is  more  accurate  to  refer  to  the  cases  as  cases 
against persons who paid for internet access which the 
RIAA has reason to believe was used by some person . . . 
to engage in peer to peer file sharing.”33 To put it another 
way,  the  suits  are  more  precisely  concerned  with 
uploading than with downloading.
The RIAA lawsuit  process begins with a suit  against 
anonymous  defendants.34 After  obtaining  an  ex  parte 
order—an  order  obtained  without  notice  to  or  the 
presence  of  an  opposing  party—the  RIAA  sends  a 
subpoena to a defendant’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
to get the allegedly wrongdoing ISP customer’s name and 
address.35 The RIAA then drops the “John Doe” suit and 
pursues the ISP customer.36 When the RIAA sues college 
28
2
. Benny Evangelista,  Online Music Finally Starts to Rock ‘N’ Roll:  
Industry  Punishes Downloaders  While  Getting Into  the Act  Itself,  S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 29, 2003, at E1.
29 . Dan  Thanh  Dang,  Recording  Industry  Sues  261  for  Piracy: 
Association Also Offering Music-Swapping Amnesty,  BALT. SUN, Sept. 9, 
2003, at 1A.
30
3
. Joshua  Freed,  Record  Companies  Win  Music  Sharing  Trial, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 5, 2007.
31 . Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works, Jan. 11, 
2008,  http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2007/01/how-riaa-
litigation-process-works.html.
32 . Id.
33 . Id.
34 . Id. at “Ex Parte Discovery—The ‘John Doe’ Phase.”
35 . ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,  RIAA  V. THE PEOPLE: FOUR YEARS LATER 1, 
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa_at_four.pdf [hereinafter  RIAA V.  PEOPLE]  ; 
Beckerman,  supra  note  31,  at  “Ex  Parte  Discovery—The  ‘John  Doe’ 
Phase.”
36 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 5; Beckerman, supra note 31, 
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students,  a  college  or  university—instead  of  a 
conventional ISP—is subject to an ex parte hearing.37 The 
RIAA  has  encountered  more  resistance  from  these 
educational  institutions  than  it  has  from  conventional 
ISPs.38
In the next phase of the litigation, the RIAA sends the 
ISP customer a letter offering a settlement.39 Typically, the 
settlement offered is $3750, nonnegotiable, and contains 
a  number  of  one-sided  provisions,  including  “a 
representation  that  peer  to  peer  file  sharing  of 
copyrighted  music  is  a  copyright  infringement.”40 The 
RIAA  encourages  early  settle-ments  and  has  set  up  a 
website for making early settlements.41
In the absence of a settlement, the RIAA brings a suit 
against  the  now-known  defendant.42 The  complaint 
features a list of songs alleged to exist in the defendant’s 
shared files folder and a second list of songs which the 
RIAA’s  investigators  allegedly  downloaded  from  the 
defendant’s computer.43
“If  the  defendant  defaults,  plaintiffs  apply  for,  and 
apparently  usually  obtain,  a  default  judgement, . . .  for 
$750 per song . . . [,] over 1000 times the 70-cent amount 
for  which  the  license  to  the  song  could  have  been 
purchased.”44 Default  judgments  may  be  likely  in  RIAA 
cases because of the economic burden of obtaining legal 
at “Ex Parte Discovery—The ‘John Doe’ Phase.”
37
3
. Id.
38 . Id. In at least one case, a motion for an ex parte hearing has 
been dismissed sua sponte. In others, the ex parte motions have been 
challenged.  Id. But  see RIAA  V.  PEOPLE,  supra  note  35,  at  9–10 
(characterizing  university  and  college  response  as  varied  and 
ambivalent).
39 . Beckerman, supra note 31, at “Pre-Lawsuit Settlement Phase.”
40
4
. Id. This representation is troubling because it does not violate 
copyright to share copyrighted files with permission. Also, settlement 
amounts may be as high as $11,000. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35.
41 . Beckerman,  supra  note  31, at “Pre-Lawsuit Settlement Phase.” 
This  program  has  been  criticized  as  a  sham  that  gets  users  to 
incriminate themselves because it does not bind the copyright holders. 
RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 5.
42 . Beckerman,  supra note  31,  at  “Litigations  Against  Named 
Defendants.”
43 . Id.
44 . Id.
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representation.45
As soon as possible, the RIAA serves pretrial discovery 
requests,  seeking  to  examine,  among  other  things,  the 
accused’s  hard  drive.46 If  this  tactic  does  not  turn  up 
evidence  of  copyright  infringement,  the  RIAA  seeks  to 
depose others who may have used the Internet account 
(e.g.,  family  members),  and  may  claim  spoliation  of 
evidence or that the accused has switched hard drives.47
Instead  of  attempting  to  prove  damages,  the  RIAA 
routinely  seeks  statutory  damages  of  $750  per  song.48 
This damages theory is being challenged on statutory and 
constitutional  grounds.49 Sometimes  the  RIAA  offers  a 
nonnegotiable settlement during the course of  litigation 
for  a  substantially  greater  dollar  amount  than  the  pre-
litigation  offer.50 In  an  October,  2007,  case,  the  only 
widely publicized case of an RIAA lawsuit running to trial 
completion,  the  plaintiffs  obtained  an  enormous,  and 
possibly unfair, judgment against the defendant.51
C. PUBLIC BACKLASH AND PUBLIC MORALITY
Defendants  have  fought  back  against  the  RIAA  in 
court  with  challenges  including  complaint  sufficiency, 
45
4
. See id. (noting the economic burden of obtaining representation 
and advising pro se litigants as to options and tactics); RIAA V. PEOPLE, 
supra note 35, at 6 (noting the cost of settling is likely to be lower than 
that of fighting the suit or suffering a default judgment).
46 . Beckerman,  supra note  31,  at  “Litigations  Against  Named 
Defendants.”
47 . Id.
48 . Id.
49 . Id. A court may reduce statutory damages to $200 where an 
infringer proves that he or she “was not aware and had no reason to 
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.” 
17  U.S.C.  §  504(c)(2)  (2000).  The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that 
excessive  punitive  damages  violate  the  Constitution’s  guarantees  of 
due  process.  See  generally  J.  Cam  Barker,  Note,  Grossly  Excessive 
Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects 
of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 537–41 (2004).
50
5
. Beckerman,  supra note  31,  at  “Litigations  Against  Named 
Defendants” ( “[T]ypically $4500 plus $375 court costs . . . .”).
51 . Freed,  supra note  30.  In  Duluth,  Minnesota,  a  $222,000 
judgment was assessed against a woman who “lives from paycheck to 
paycheck.”  Id.;  Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497, 
slip op. at 1 (D. Minn. 2007).
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affirmative  defenses,  and  counterclaims.52 Also,  critics 
have  publicly  attacked  the  RIAA  and  its  lawsuits.  The 
subject matter of the attacks range from the RIAA’s choice 
of litigation targets and tactics to the RIAA’s view of the 
law. The following quote is emblematic of the criticism:
It’s as if the music companies spent months with focus groups, 
developing a strategy most likely to piss off and alienate the 
demographic that is most likely to purchase their products. . . . 
[W]hen your values pit massive corporations against high school 
kids,  single  moms  and  G.I.s,  you  have  to  wonder  about  the 
underlying strategy.53
The  RIAA  has  taken  criticism  for  pursuing  a  U.S. 
serviceman (and threatening to expose sexually explicit 
files  on  his  computer).54 Other  unpopular  targets  are 
teenagers,  college  students,  parents,  grandparents, 
disabled  persons,  and  deceased  persons.55 Even  if  the 
strategy  is  sound  from  the  standpoint  of  rational 
deterrence,56 that fact does not guarantee that the public 
will or should approve.57
The  litigation  targets  report  feeling  violated  and 
otherwise treated unfairly by the lawsuits and the tactics 
used.  They  characterize  the  damages  as  too  high, 
52
5
. Beckerman,  supra note  31,  at  “Litigations  Against  Named 
Defendants”; Ryan Carter, RIAA, extortion, and conspiracy, in the same 
sentence,  http://www.downloadsquad.com/2007/06/06/riaa-extortion-
and-conspiracy-in-the-same-sentence/  (last  visited  Sept.  13,  2007); 
Grant  Robertson,  Downloader  fights  back  against  RIAA, 
http://www.Downloadsquad.  com/2007/01/31/downloader-fights-back-
against-riaa/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
53 . Eric  Eggertson,  RIAA Isn’t  Trying to  Win  a  Popularity  Contest 
(Maybe  it  Should  Consider  Trying), 
http://www.commonsensepr.com/2007/07/30/riaa-isnt-trying-to-win-a-
popularity-contest-maybe-it-should-consider-trying/  (last  visited  Sept. 
19, 2007).
54 . Eric  Bangeman,  RIAA  Backtracks  After  Embarrassing  P2P 
Defendant, ARS TECHNICA,  July  30,  2007, 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070730-riaa-backtracks-after-
embarrassing-p2p-defendant.html.
55 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 6–8; Beckerman, supra note 
31, at “Litigations Against Named Defendants”; Grant Robertson, RIAA 
targets  college  students,  again, 
http://www.downloadsquad.com/2007/03/09/riaa-targets-college-
students-again/  (last  visited  Sept.  13,  2007);  Sag,  supra  note 19,  at 
146–47.
56 . Sag, supra note 18, at 145–52.
57 . See id. at  155 (“There may be social  welfare or public  policy 
considerations  that  cast  the . . .  tactic  of  end  user  litigation  in  a 
negative light”).
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particularly in light of the non-commercial nature of the 
file sharing or the status of the defendants.58 Defendants 
have  alleged  trespass,  fraud,  unfair  trade  practices, 
extortion, conspiracy, and defamation against the RIAA.59 
Journalists,  public  interest  groups,  and  other  public 
commentators have offered similar criticisms.60 Practicing 
lawyers  have  characterized  RIAA  tactics  as  violative  of 
procedural  rights.61 At the same time, RIAA critics have 
voiced respect for intellectual property rights and for the 
profit  interests  of  content  producers.62 Therefore,  the 
criticism should not be dismissed as mere quarreling with 
the existence of intellectual property or the commerciality 
of music.
Critics have also taken issue with the RIAA’s view of 
the  law.  The  Computer  &  Communications  Industry 
Association and the U.S. Internet Association, both trade 
groups,  along  with  the  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation 
(EFF),  a public interest group, have attacked the RIAA’s 
theory  that  making  copyrighted  files  available  for 
downloading constitutes infringement.63 Critics have also 
challenged the RIAA’s view that copyright infringement is 
theft.64 Some  criticism  has  focused  on  the  RIAA’s 
58
5
. See,  e.g., Freed,  supra note  30;  Anna  Jo  Bratton,  Lawsuits 
trouble  music  downloaders, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-05-13-down  loading_n.htm 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
59 . Carter, supra note 52; Robertson, supra note 52.
60
6
. See,  e.g.,  RIAA  V.  PEOPLE,  supra note  35,  at  4,  6–8;  Press 
Release,  ACLU,  Citing Right  to  Anonymity  Online,  ACLU  Asks  Boston 
Court to Block Recording Industry Subpoena (Sept. 29, 2003), available 
at  http://www.aclu. org/privacy/anon/15590prs20030929.html; Boycott-
RIAA,  Our  Mission,  http://  www.boycott-riaa.com/mission  (last  visited 
Oct.  7,  2007);  Carter,  supra note  52;  Jon  Newton,  RIAA  -  Recording 
Infamy Ass of America, http://www.p2pnet. net/story/13570 (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2007).
61 . See, e.g., Beckerman, supra note 31.
62 . See,  e.g.,  Barker,  supra note  49,  at  525;  Boycott-RIAA,  supra 
note 60; Bratton, supra note 58; Fred von Lohmann, Copyright Silliness 
on Campus, WASH. POST, June 6, 2007, at A23.
63 . Boycott-RIAA,  On  the  Importance  of  Elektra  v.  Barker, 
http://www.boycott-riaa.com/article/19960 (last  visited Oct.  11,  2007). 
Amicus  curiae  briefs  are  available  at 
http://info.riaalawsuits.us/documents.htm# Elektra_v_Barker.
64 . See,  e.g.,  Eliot  Van Buskirk, The RIAA Lawsuits Clarified Once 
and  for  All,  http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6450_7-5081098-1.html?
tag=feat.1 (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); Stephen Dionne, Letter to the 
Editor:  RIAA  Crackdown  Attacks  “Creative  Freedom,” 
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perceived hijacking of copyright law to the detriment of 
the public.65
Besides  these  criticisms,  there  is  other  evidence  of 
the  failure  of  the  RIAA to  successfully  appeal  to  public 
morality  over  file  sharing.  Despite  the  lawsuits,  file 
sharing continues to grow66 and commercial online music 
services lag behind.67 There is the widespread belief that 
copyright  infringement  is  not  immoral.68 Even 
sophisticated members of the public may hold this view.69 
Lastly, there is the belief that the recording industry is a 
hypocritical  bully  deserving  to  have  its  intellectual 
property infringed.70
D. THE PERTINENT COPYRIGHT LAW
Despite what critics of the RIAA may believe, sharing 
copyrighted  music  files  without  authorization  is 
infringement.71 Reproduction and distribution are among 
the exclusive rights vested in an author at the moment a 
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.72 The 
obvious  interpretation  is  that  downloading  is  a  kind  of 
reproduction and uploading is a kind of distribution.73
http://media.www.dailyfreepress.com/media/ 
storage/paper87/news/2004/12/03/Opinion/Letter.To.The.Editor.Riaa.Cra
ck down.Attacks.creative.Freedom-821127.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 
2007).
65
6
. See, e.g., Boycott-RIAA, supra note 60; Dionne, supra note 64.
66 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 11–13.
67 . Id. at 14–15.
68 . AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH FOX, DOWNLOADING FREE MUSIC: INTERNET MUSIC 
LOVERS DON’T THINK IT’S STEALING 5–6  (2000),  available  at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Music_Report2.pdf.  File 
sharing  was  already  a  public  issue  by  2000.  See  notes  64–65  and 
accompanying text. That file sharing has continued to increase suggests 
that the public does not find file sharing morally unacceptable. Also, the 
public may view copyright infringement as a malum prohibitum (wrong 
because forbidden by law) offense rather than a malum in se (inherently 
wrong) one. Lantagne, supra note 19, at 282.
69 . LENHART & FOX, supra note 69, at 6.
70
7
. Lantagne, supra note 19, at 280–81.
71 . In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
72 . 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
73 . See,  e.g.,  A&M Records,  Inc.  v.  Napster,  Inc.  239  F.3d  1004, 
1014 (9th Cir. 2001). It is important to note that making a file available 
for downloading is not actual uploading, making controversial the RIAA’s 
argument that merely “making available” is infringement. See Boycott-
RIAA, supra 63. But see Napster, 239 F. 3d at 1014 (stating that “users 
who  upload  file  names  to  the  search  index . . .  violate  plaintiffs’ 
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As a remedy for infringement, a copyright owner may 
recover  actual  damages  plus  the  infringer’s  profits,  or 
statutory  damages.74 The  owner  gets  to  recover  one 
award of statutory damages per individual work infringed 
by  the  defendant.75 At  its  discretion,  the  court  sets 
damages within a range of $750 to $30,000.76 If the court 
finds the infringement “was committed willfully,” the court 
may increase the damages up to $150,000.77 On the other 
hand, if the court finds that infringement was committed 
innocently,  it  may  reduce  the  damages  to  $200.78 The 
standard for finding innocent infringement is high and file 
sharers are not likely to meet it.79
If  a jury tries a case, the jury can set the award of 
damages,80 which is  what  happened in  the  recent  case 
against Jammie Thomas.81 The jury awarded damages of 
over $9,000 per song (for a total of $222,000) against the 
single  mother,  after  having  found  her  violation  to  be 
willful.82 According to the plaintiffs’ attorney in that case, 
the jury did not explain their verdict.83
In file sharing cases, the bulk of a statutory damage 
award will be punitive in nature, if not in name, because 
the  minimum  statutory  award  vastly  exceeds  actual 
damage  suffered.84 A  critic  has  offered  that  these 
damages may, through aggregation of awards for each in 
a series of instances, violate constitutional due process.85
II. SOLUTIONS TO THE FILE SHARING PROBLEM
The ideal solution to the file sharing problem is one 
that  fulfills  the needs of  both consumers and copyright 
distribution rights”).
74
7
. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000).
75 . 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
76 . Id.
77 . 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000).
78 . Id.
79 . Barker, supra note 49, at 533–34.
80
8
. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 
(1998).
81 . Freed, supra note 30.
82 . Id.
83 . Id. Although the jury awarded for each of twenty-four songs, the 
record companies alleged she had traded 1702 songs. Id.
84 . Barker, supra note 49, at 525.
85 . See generally id.
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holders to the maximum degree that both sets of needs 
are compatible. In the context of music commerce, what 
copyright holders chiefly need is relief and protection from 
thievery. They have justified expectations of payment for 
their products, and they ought to be fairly compensated—
as  they  would  be  in  standard  commercial  transactions 
(e.g.,  purchasing  a  CD  from  a  store).  What  consumers 
chiefly  need—what  they  are  apparently  unwilling  to  do 
without—is efficient and convenient access to the music 
they want. The challenge is to find some legal means of 
accommodating both consumers and copyright holders.
Secondarily,  this  Note  assumes  a  preference  for 
private over public solutions. Government regulation is a 
heavy-handed  tool.  In  a  society  where  property  and 
freedom  of  contract  are  respected  as  between  private 
actors, the state has a peerless coercive power: the power 
to compel behavior without providing anything of value in 
return. This makes for a unique market immunity that is 
more  valuable  in  dealing  with  some  matters—law  and 
order concerns,  for  example—than with  others—matters 
where what is “good” can be plausibly defined in market 
terms.86 This Note assumes that the allocation of  music 
products  and  services  is  best  served  by  a  free,  legally 
secure market.
A. EXTANT PROPOSALS
Thinkers have put forward a number of proposals for 
solving the file sharing problem. These proposals vary in 
their  practicality,  effectiveness,  and  compatibility  with 
public morality.
1. Business as Usual or the RIAA Plan
The current  approach to the file  sharing problem is 
the RIAA’s three-pronged attack of legal music services, 
86
8
. Communist countries, such as the old Soviet Union and modern 
Cuba, have suffered notorious supply failures due to their policy choice 
that government decision makers, immune to market demands, should 
decide who gets  how much of what is  to be supplied.  See generally 
THOMAS SOWELL,  BASIC ECONOMICS 11–37 (3d ed. 2007). These failures might 
have been avoided by letting prices, capacity to pay, and purchasing 
priorities  serve  their  natural  functions,  as  they  do  under  the  free 
market.
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education, and lawsuits.87 This strategy is  a deterrence-
based  one,  designed  to  persuade  people  not  to  share 
music  files  illegally.  Is  any  or  all  of  this  approach 
effective?  The  RIAA  claims  that  without  the  recording 
industry’s  efforts,  there  would  be  more  illegal 
downloading, and that “the industry’s efforts have made 
an  impact  on  attitudes,  practices,  cultural  norms, 
awareness and the business climate for legal services.”88 
These claims are so modest and they make such intuitive 
sense that it  would be surprising if  they were not true. 
There are ego costs in doing something one knows to be 
illegal, particularly when there are legal alternatives, and 
there are financial and ego costs in risking lawsuits.
As  the  cost  of  a  behavior  increases,  that  behavior 
should  become  less  likely  than  it  would  be  if  its  cost 
stayed  the  same.  Focusing  on  the  litigation  aspect, 
Professor  Sag  has  argued  that  the  RIAA’s  strategy  of 
targeting  end-users,  particularly  including  marginal  and 
sympathetic  infringers,  makes  sense  from  a  rational 
choice perspective because the practice elevates the cost 
of  copyright  infringement  for  those  most  likely  to  be 
persuaded  to  switch  from  illegal  to  legal  habits  of 
acquiring music.89
Regardless of the rationality of the theory supporting 
it,  the  evidence  is  discouraging.  According  to  a  2004 
source, the percentage of Americans downloading music 
files dropped by half since the RIAA began its user lawsuit 
campaign in 2003.90 However,  the data may have been 
skewed by reluctance to  report  downloading caused by 
publicity of the lawsuits.91 More recent data indicate that 
since  2003 file  sharing  activity  has  more  than  doubled 
after that initial  drop.92 “[T]ens of millions of U.S. music 
fans  continue  to  use  P2P  networks  and  other  new 
technologies to share music.”93 So while it  may be true 
that  the  RIAA’s  tactics  are  more  effective  than  doing 
87
8
. RIAA, supra note 6.
88 . Id.
89 . Sag, supra note 18, at 155.
90
9
. LEE RAINIE ET AL.,  THE IMPACT OF RECORDING INDUSTRY SUITS AGAINST FILE 
SWAPPERS 1  (2004),  available  at http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
pdfs/PIP_File_Swapping_Memo_0104.pdf.
91 . Id. at 3.
92 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 11–13.
93 . Id. at 13.
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nothing at all, the current approach has, at best, slowed 
the growth of file sharing, and not actually diminished file 
sharing.
The failure of the RIAA approach is probably not due 
to failure to make users aware of copyright law and the 
potential consequences of violating it. A 2004 poll of a key 
group  of  music  consumers,  children  aged  eight  to 
eighteen, found that “[m]ore than half . . .  with Internet 
access continue to download free music even though they 
know they are breaking the law . . . .”94 Although 88% of 
those  polled  knew  that  popular  music  is  usually 
copyrighted, 56% of them downloaded music.95 A survey 
of college students published in 2005 indicated that 70% 
have downloaded music in violation of copyright,96 despite 
awareness that there could be consequences.97 The EFF, 
an RIAA critic, agrees with the assessment that the RIAA 
has “increase[d] awareness of the copyright laws.”98
The  failure  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  RIAA 
approach  is  a  deterrence-based  strategy.  Professor 
Schultz  explored  this  possibility  in  a  2006  article, 
examining  the  theory  and  practice  of  deterrence  in 
relation  to  the  file  sharing  problem.99 He  advised  that 
deterrence is not effective due to the lack of consistency 
with which file sharers are punished and the absence of 
social  norms,  among  file  sharers,  against  copyright 
infringement.100 Against the millions of file sharers, fewer 
than  30,000  lawsuits  have  been  filed.101 Deterrence 
strategies are not just a matter of severity of punishment 
94
9
. David  McGuire,  Report:  Kids  Pirate  Music  Freely, 
WASHINGTONPOST.com, May 18, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A37231-2004  (last  visited  Oct.  18,  2007)  (relying  on  a 
Harris Interactive April 2004 poll, citation omitted in original).
95 . Id.
96 . MICHAEL GROSS, HIGHER EDUCATION UNLICENSED SOFTWARE EXPERIENCE—STUDENTS 
AND ACADEMICS SURVEY 30  (2005),  available  at 
http://definetheline.com/resources/BSA-Ipsos-Education-Survey-
June2005.pdf.
97 . Id. at 2.
98 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 13.
99 . Mark  F.  Schultz,  Fear  and  Norms  and  Rock  &  Roll:  What 
Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright 
Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 661–65 (2006).
100
1
. Id.
101 . Freed, supra note 30.
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but also certainty of punishment.102 As mentioned earlier, 
Sag has noted the utility of litigating against marginal file 
sharers.103 Such  litigation  increases  certainty  in 
demonstrating  that  even  small-time  violators  may  be 
targeted.  However,  the  statistical  unlikelihood  of  being 
targeted remains great. If Schultz’s analysis is correct, it 
would be impractically expensive to achieve the requisite 
consistency of litigation against file sharers necessary for 
a  deterrence  approach  to  be  effective.  Also,  declining 
press  attention  to  RIAA  lawsuits  due  to  their  being 
commonplace may diminish the certainty of punishment 
in the eyes of potential violators.104
Another  factor  to  consider  is  the  inadequacy  of 
legitimate  online  music  services.  Fully  legal  music 
services,  such  as  iTunes  and  the  reformed  version  of 
Napster, once carried high hopes of being strong medicine 
for the file sharing problem.105
During  the  initial  dip  in  file  sharing,  after  the  RIAA 
began suing individual users, use of legal music services 
rose.106 As of February 2006, Apple’s iTunes, launched in 
2003,  had already sold more than 600 million songs.107 
iTunes  offers  customers  the  option  of  purchasing 
individual tracks as well as entire albums for substantial 
savings  over  the  cost  of  purchasing  a  CD  in  a  retail 
store.108 The  new  Napster  offers  a  subscription  service 
with  unlimited  downloads  for  a  monthly  fee.109 Napster 
and iTunes  are  only  the  most  well-known of  legitimate 
music services; there are others, including Yahoo! Music110 
102
1
. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS, 116–20 (7th ed. 2001).
103 . Sag, supra note 18, at 155.
104 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 13.
105 . See generally Lantagne, supra note 19, at 289.
106 . Eric J. Sinrod, RIAA Music Lawsuits Chill Online Downloading, USA 
TODAY.COM,  Jan.  14,  2004,  http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/ 
ericjsinrod/2004-01-15-sinrod_x.htm.
107 . Glenn Peoples, Your Rights Reserved?, MACWORLD, Feb. 1, 2006, at 
22.
108 . Individual  tracks  cost  $0.99  and  albums  cost  $  9.99.  iTunes 
Store,  http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/music.html  (last  visited  Mar. 
22, 2008).
109 . Try  Napster  Free  for  7  Days, 
http://www.napster.com/choose/index. html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
110 . Yahoo!  Music,  http://music.yahoo.com/  (last  visited  Oct.  21, 
2007).
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and  Real  Networks.111 Music  services  offer  streaming 
media, downloads, cell phone ringtones, exclusive media, 
and  even  free,  user-friendly  client  programs  for 
downloading  and  managing  music,  video,  and  other 
media.112
That these services have achieved some measure of 
success and acceptance is clear. However, it appears that 
these services, like the lawsuits, have merely slowed the 
growth  of  illegal  file  sharing  rather  than  actually 
diminished  it.  The  number  of  legal  downloads  through 
these  services  is  marginal  compared  to  the  number  of 
illegal downloads across file sharing networks.113 A 2006 
article  reported  that  the  International  Federation  of 
Phonographic Industries (IFPI), a recording industry trade 
group,  estimates  that  the  ratio  of  illegal  to  legal 
downloads is forty to one.114
The  EFF  has  identified  three  flaws  that  make  legal 
music services inadequate substitutes for file sharing: “(1) 
anti-consumer . . .  restrictions[,]  (2)  limited  inventory[,] 
and (3) high prices.”115 Various features, such as Digital 
Rights Manage-ment, restrict consumers from transferring 
music  from  computers  to  other  devices  and  prevent 
consumers from accessing their music after discontinuing 
subscription to  a  service.116 Music  obtained through file 
sharing  is  not  hampered  by  such  restrictions.117 Legal 
services  have  limited  catalogs  that  may  exclude  even 
popular  acts,  such  as  The  Beatles,  as  well  as  smaller 
acts.118 File sharing is, at least in theory, not subject to 
this limitation.119
111
1
. Products  and  Services  >  ASP  Services, 
http://www.realnetworks.com/ products/asp/index.html (last visited Oct. 
21, 2007).
112 . Id.
113 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 14.
114 . BBC  News,  Universal  Backs  Free  Music  Offer, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/business/5294842.stm (last visited Oct. 21, 
2007).
115 . RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 14.
116 . Id.
117 . This statement assumes that the files users share are rendered 
from CDs, DVDs, or other original sources through processes that do not 
restrict  transfer or  use of the resulting data.  Most discussions of  file 
sharing assume likewise. See, e.g., id. at 14–15.
118 . Id. at 15.
119 . Availability of music across file sharing networks is not limited 
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The EFF’s  criticism that  legal  music services charge 
too much is its weakest. The nature of the free market 
renders dubious any claim that a popular product is too 
high-priced in any objective way. Such criticisms assume, 
or at least appear to assume, that there is an objectively 
“correct” price for a given thing. In reality, market prices 
are information-conveying entities determined by realities 
that are mostly, if not entirely, beyond a seller’s control.120 
A detailed discussion of the economics of music pricing is 
neither  feasible  nor  necessary  here.  Plainly,  any  price, 
whether a per-download fee or a monthly subscription fee, 
is unattractive when the same product121 is available for 
free—and  without  profit,  the  music  industry  would  go 
away altogether.
The RIAA approach appears to be ineffective. Millions 
of U.S. citizens are violating copyright through file sharing. 
Besides being ineffective, as discussed above, the RIAA 
approach,  through  its  litigation  component,  offends  a 
popular sense of decency and fairness.122
One  of  the  RIAA’s  essential  problems  is  that  its 
business model is stuck in the past: the recording industry 
is trying to force a potentially  inconvenient purchase of 
products  that  can  be  conveniently  obtained  for  free 
online.123 The  RIAA’s  practice  runs  contrary  to  the 
by a pre-determined catalog. It is, however, limited by what other users 
across  the  network  make  available.  One of  the  advantages  of  legal 
services is the reliable availability of their catalog, however limited by 
licensing and storage space that catalog may be.
120
1
. See generally SOWELL,  supra  note 87. Prices convey information 
about scarcity and demand. Id.
121 . Of course, a corrupted, virus-infected, or misidentified file copied 
from another user is  not the same product as a commercial service’s 
well-formed, wholesome file that is what it purports to be.
122 . Public opinion is not monolithic, but the research for this note 
uncovered little evidence of support in the general public for the RIAA 
and its strategy. Evidence found did little or nothing more than affirm 
the existence of intellectual property rights and the corollary right to 
vindicate them. Supra note 62 and accompanying text. Such sentiments 
are difficult to read as support for the RIAA’s strategy.
123 . See Lincoln Russell,  Why We Love Google and Hate the RIAA, 
ICRONTIC,  July  11,  2006, 
http://icrontic.com/articles/why_we_love_google_hate  _riaa  (“[The 
RIAA’s] profit margin lives and dies by whether they can get you to buy 
the copies of the intellectual property they sell,  rather than the free 
ones you can find online.”).
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progress  of  technology.124 One  key  to  the  file  sharing 
problem  may  be  to  embrace  the  Internet’s  power  for 
convenient and efficient exchange of information among 
free actors who do not charge a fee for transactions. Such 
a choice would be inherently more compatible with public 
morality to the extent that the internet-using public has 
adopted an ethos of sharing. One writer articulated the 
normalcy  of  downloading  this  way:  “The  thing  that  I 
always  try  to  say  to  the  movie  and  music  executives 
frothing at the mouth . . .  is that  everybody can’t be an 
outlaw.  If  everybody  does  it,  it’s  normal  rather  than 
aberrant behavior.”125 The recording industry should not 
fight entrenched norms if it can find some way to leverage 
them for profit.
2. Changing the Law
Some  critics  have  proposed  that  the  file  sharing 
problem be resolved by changing copyright law. One such 
proposal is to reduce the duration of copyright.126 Critics 
taking this tack focus on the original brevity of copyright 
and its enormous dilation to its present length of virtually 
two lifetimes.127 As they see it, keeping works out of the 
public domain for such a great length of time does not 
properly  balance  the  interests  of  the  public  and  of 
creators.128 More  importantly,  they  also  argue  that  this 
length of copyright is outside the Constitution’s “limited 
124
1
. The progress of technology is not only the development of new 
means of transmitting information, but also the way people choose to 
use  them.  The famous  popularity  of  free  and accessible  file  sharing 
client software such as Limewire,  blogging services such as Blogger, 
networking services such as MySpace and Facebook, and media sharing 
services such as Flickr and YouTube reflect a “sharing ethos” that can 
be summarized under  the phrase,  “the internet  is  for  sharing.”  See, 
e.g., William Gould, Links, http://www. harmony.demon.co.uk/links.htm 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2008). This phrase has become highly popular with 
multiple variations findable with Google searches.
125 . Michael Wolff,  Stop, Thief!, N.Y.  MAG., Mar. 3., 2003, at 24, 26 
(italics  original),  available  at 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/columns/media life/n_8384/.
126 . See Dionne, supra note 64 (author’s criticism of current duration 
of  copyright  and  invitation  to  movement  of  like-minded  individuals 
imply that law should be changed).
127 . See, e.g.,  id. (“Copyright terms now last the creator’s lifetime 
plus 70 years.”)
128 . Id.
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times” clause.129 Professor Ku has asserted that copyright 
is no longer necessary due to new, more direct, means of 
production  (desktop)  and  distribution  (digital),  and  that 
intermediary  content  distributors  (e.g.,  record  labels), 
protected by copyright, add no creative value.130
Under current constitutional jurisprudence, the merit 
of the constitutional criticism is doubtful.131 The merit of 
the  public  policy  criticism  is  debatable.  The  U.S. 
understanding of intellectual property appears to revolve 
around  economic  incentive,132 and  lengthy  copyright 
provides a major  incentive to create artistic  works.  The 
idea that  this  question  is  one  of  balancing  private  and 
public  benefits  is  simplistic,  obscuring  the  notion  that, 
without incentives, people will not create in the first place. 
That  a  broader  public  domain,  and  fewer  works 
altogether,  would  be  more  beneficial  to  the  public  is 
doubtful.
Shrinking copyright duration is of dubious feasibility. 
The  trend  over  the  course  of  U.S.  history  has  been 
expansion.133 Also,  the private beneficiaries of  copyright 
have  active  and,  reputedly,  powerful  lobbies.134 More 
importantly, only a very drastic diminishment of copyright 
duration—beyond the modest allowance of  1790—would 
129
1
. Id. The  relevant  text  states  that  Congress  has  authority  to 
secure exclusive rights to creators for “limited [t]imes.” U.S. CONST. art. I. 
§ 8.
130 . Raymond Shih Ray Ku,  The Creative Destruction of Copyright: 
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
263, 295–300 (2002).
131 . See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (holding that 
the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, extending copyright to author’s 
lifetime plus seventy years, is not unconstitutional).
132 . The relevant portion of the Constitution, U.S.  CONST.  art. I. § 8, 
prefaces the operative clause with a utilitarian justification of promoting 
“Progress  of  Science  and  useful  Arts.”  Id.  Protection  of  copyright 
institutes a financial incentive to create.  See Kimberly Kerry,  Music on 
the Internet: Is Technology Moving Faster than Copyright Law?, 42 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 967, 986–87 (2002). The American public appears to think 
of copyright as a financial, rather than a moral, matter. Lantagne, supra 
note 19, at 283.
133 . Eldred,  537 U.S. at  194–96 (noting that federal  copyright was 
fourteen years—exclusive of the permitted renewal—in 1790 and was 
expanded under the 1909, 1976, and 1998 Acts).
134 . See  Boycott-RIAA,  supra  note  61  (“Copyright  reform  will 
undoubtedly be extremely difficult to achieve due to the fact that the 
RIAA’s entire purpose is to lobby our government to change the law in 
their favor.”)
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benefit the millions of users sharing music or movies of 
recent  vintage.135 Copyright  duration  appears  to  be  of 
little or no real relevance to the file sharing problem.
Also, while Ku’s argument about major record labels 
being unnecessary to the recording of  modern music is 
likely true with respect to some kinds of music, it is likely 
not  true  with  regard  to  the  chart-topping,  highly 
profitable, heavily produced music widely traded among 
file  sharers.136 The  costly  production,  talent,  and 
equipment  involved  require  greater  resources  than 
independent recording artists are likely to have at their 
disposal.  Additionally,  intermediary  distributors  serve 
important  functions  of  promotion  and  channeling 
consumer  choice137—functions  that  benefit  both  artists 
and  consumers.  More  importantly,  copyright  not  only 
enables  the  intermediary-dependent  music  business 
model, for better or for worse; it also protects the rights of 
content producers.  Even with desktop studio production 
and  regionally  or  locally  targeted  internet  distribution, 
copyright is still necessary to protect against freeloading.
A  more  feasible  proposal  is  copyright  damages 
reform. This proposal starts with the idea that aggregation 
of  statutory  damages  across  multiple  similar  violations 
can distort incentive to sue and impose, inappropriately, 
“‘wholly  proportionate’  reprehensibility.”138 Such 
aggregation may also violate due process.139
As  to  the  first  effect,  “once  the  plaintiff  has  an 
adequate incentive to sue, there is little need to increase 
this  monetary  incentive  by  multiplying  the  penalty 
thousands  of  times.”140 The  idea  is  that  the  punitive 
portion of statutory damages—the part that goes above 
and  beyond  compensation—is  often  an  important 
motivator  for plaintiffs  to vindicate their  rights,  but this 
motivational threshold is easily met and further incentive 
135
1
. A commonplace assumption in discussions of music file sharing 
is  that  the bulk of  music  being shared was recorded within  the last 
thirty  years.  See,  e.g., Dionne,  supra  note  65  (“Arrhh!  Time  to  be 
illegally downloadin’ me Britney Spears!”).
136 . See Opderbeck, supra note 17, at 1746.
137 . Id.
138 . Barker, supra note 49, at 549.
139 . Id. at 526.
140 . Id. at 549.
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is unnecessary.141 As to the second effect, the argument is 
that,  because  a  major  part  of  the  defendant’s 
reprehensibility  comes  from  having  committed  to  an 
unlawful course of action, it is fairer to treat each instance 
of a series of infringements as part of a larger scheme.142 
A proponent of this reform noted that “an analogy can be 
drawn between the criminal defendant who enters a store 
and  steals  multiple  items  and  the  civil  defendant  who 
installs file-sharing software and downloads many files.”143
As  to  due  process,  punitive  damages  may  be  so 
grossly excessive as to violate  it.144 The Supreme Court 
has  articulated  three  guideposts  for  deciding  when  a 
damage award is grossly excessive: the reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s  conduct,  the ratio  of  punitive damages 
awarded  to  harm  inflicted  on  the  plaintiff,  and  a 
comparison between the punitive damages awarded and 
the criminal and civil penalties for similar misconduct.145 
One  proponent  of  statutory  damages  reform  maintains 
that  aggregated  statutory  damages  do  violate  due 
process under the Court’s test, but that the courts will be 
loath to overturn aggregated statutory damages, due to 
“practical institutional considerations.”146
The proponent offered two congressional options for 
reforming  statutory  copyright  damages.  Congress  could 
enact  a  statutory  damage  scheme permitting  courts  to 
assign below the current damages floor in the aggregation 
of  many  similar  claims.147 Alternatively,  Congress  could 
authorize  a  “specialized  dispute  resolution  system”  to 
detect  and  punish  illegal  file  sharing  with  greater 
efficiency, imposing smaller penalties on a wider net of 
the file sharing public.148
Statutory damages reform would alleviate some of the 
apparent  unfairness  to  file  sharing  defendants,  but  it 
might also undermine the deterrence power of lawsuits—
141
1
. Id. at 549–52.
142 . Id. at 552–53.
143 . Id. at 553.
144 . TXO Prod.  Corp.  v.  Alliance Res.  Corp.,  509 U.S.  443,  459–62 
(1993).
145 . BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–85 (1996).
146 . Barker, supra note 49, at 554–56.
147 . Id. at 558.
148 . Id. at 559.
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something the RIAA values and is determined, for the time 
being,  to  exploit.  The  RIAA  and  others  invested  in 
deterrence  strategies  would  likely  lobby  against  such 
reform.
What  these  proposals  to  change  the  law  have  in 
common is an aim to protect file sharers from undesirable 
consequences. Neither attempts to vindicate the infringed 
interests  of  the  copyright  holders.  Because  the  current 
statutory  damages  structure  is  offensive,  reforming  it 
could be a useful component in a comprehensive solution 
that also addresses the needs of copyright holders.
3. Levies
One way to address the needs of copyright holders is 
an  alternative  compensation  system.  The  RIAA’s 
characterization of music piracy as a kind of theft relies on 
a  misappropriation-of-value  theory.149 Unlike  theft  of 
tangible property or services, there is no taking of scarce 
resources with alternative uses. The theft consists of the 
fact that something of value (music) has been wrongfully 
taken (infringing on exclusive rights) from its owner (the 
copyright holder). In the context of music commerce, the 
wrongful taking consists of copying music without paying 
for it. Thus, for the principal concern of music commerce, 
if  copyright  holders  are  compensated  for  the  taking  of 
their property,  the theft disappears and their  rights are 
vindicated.150
One  alternative  compensation  system  is  for  the 
government to levy fees and pay copyright holders from 
the proceeds. The levy system could permit the free flow 
of  information  on  P2P  networks  for  “noncommercial 
dissemi-nation, modification, and copying of works made 
available to the public.”151 The revenue lost to copyright 
149
1
. RIAA, supra note 11.
150 . On the other hand, profitable transactions, the principal concern 
of commerce, necessarily implicates other concerns, such as control of 
distribution.  Control  of  distribution is  an obvious artistic  concern;  an 
artist  may  believe  that  a  particular  work  is  unique  and,  therefore, 
deserving of limited release to devoted fans. Somewhat less obviously, 
control of distribution is also a commercial concern because contrived 
scarcity combined with high demand raises market value. The diamond 
trade is the most notorious example of this principle in action.
151 . Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing 
Conflict  Between  Copyright  Law  and  Peer-to-Peer  Technology,  28 
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holders  could  be  restored  through  fees  on  software, 
services, or hardware related to copying or file sharing.152
There  is  precedent  for  analogous  systems  in  other 
countries  and  in  the  United  States.  In  Germany,  for 
example,  the  law  does  not  hold  individuals  liable  for 
making personal  copies  because there is  a levy on the 
sale  of  relevant  copying  and  recording  equipment  and 
media.153 In the United States, the Audio Home Recording 
Act  (AHRA)  of  1992  barred  claims  against  individuals 
using “digital  recording technology to copy music.”154 In 
exchange for that immunity to individual consumers, U.S. 
manufacturers had to pay a two percent tax on “digital 
audio  recording  devices”  and  a  three  percent  tax  on 
“digital audio recording media” to compensate copyright 
holders.155 This tax is passed on to consumers in the form 
of  higher  prices.  The  government  would  collect  the 
payments, and then divide the monies among the various 
right holders, each of whom had to file a claim with the 
Librarian of Congress.156 At the time of the AHRA, Digital 
Audio Tape (DAT) and CD duplication appeared to be a 
threat to the music industry due to their capacity to make 
high quality copies of recorded music. The AHRA is largely 
irrelevant  to  current  challenges  except  by  way  of 
example.157
In  imitation  of  the  AHRA,  Congress  could  enact 
legislation that bars suits against file sharers in exchange 
for levies on computers, blank CDs, music players (e.g., 
iPods),  or  internet  service.  The  proceeds  from  the 
collected fees could be distrib-uted pro rata to copyright 
holders  based  on  a  determination  of  how  often  their 
content is downloaded and its retail value.
Abstractly  considered,  this  solution  appears  almost 
ideal.  It  grants users convenient and efficient access to 
the music they want and compensates copyright holders 
without  the  ugliness  and  inefficiency  of  lawsuits.  As 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 195, 239–40 (2006).
152
1
. Neil Weinstock Netanel,  Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to 
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 43 (2003)
153 . Id. at 32.
154 . Morea, supra note 151, at 246.
155 . Id.
156 . Id. at 247.
157 . See id. at 247.
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applied, however, it presents some problems. If a broad 
range of technology is subject to the levy, a broad range 
of  consumers will  end up subsidizing the activities  of  a 
small  range  of  consumers.158 CDs  and  computers  have 
many uses other than file sharing, and, while file sharing 
is  widespread,  only a minority  of  computer  users share 
files.159 Some commentators favor a levy on bandwidth as 
use of bandwidth is related to file sharing,160 but even a 
levy  on  bandwidth  can  be  overbroad  as  plenty  of 
legitimate computer activities—such as network gaming—
are  also  associated  with  high  use  of  bandwidth.161 
“[B]andwidth usage is unlikely to constitute a reasonable 
proxy for infringement.”162
Additionally, artists and record companies might learn 
how  to  manipulate  the  tracking  system to  fraudulently 
assign to themselves a greater share than they deserve of 
the  levy  proceeds.163 More  importantly,  governmental 
tracking of  file  sharing implicates  privacy concerns and 
the  government’s  involvement  in  the  collection  and 
assignment  of  monies  may  stifle  the  development  of 
alternative content distribution systems that might better 
fulfill the needs of some consumers but be ill-suited to the 
government’s  methods  of  determining  downloads  (or 
whatever  metric  a  levy  system  would  use  to  discern 
market share).
4. Large Scale Private Licensing
Another alternative compensation  system, similar  in 
some respects to government levies, is large scale private 
licensing,  in  which  copyright  holders  would  arrange, 
directly or through intermediaries, with ISPs, educational 
institutions, or end users for the right to freely trade files 
in  exchange  for  fees.  A  principal  advocate  for  such  a 
system is the EFF, and its articulation is concise and easily 
understood:
[T]he  music  industry  forms one  or  more  collecting  societies, 
which then offers file sharing music fans the opportunity to “get 
158
1
. Opderbeck, supra note 17, at 1749.
159 . Morea, supra note 151, at 248.
160 . Opderbeck, supra note 17, at 1749.
161 . Id.
162 . Id. at 1750.
163 . Morea, supra note 151, at 248.
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legit” in exchange for a reasonable regular payment, say $5 per 
month. So long as they pay, the fans are free to keep doing 
what they are going to do anyway—share the music they love 
using  whatever  software  they  like  on  whatever  computer 
platform  they  prefer—without  fear  of  lawsuits.  The  money 
collected  gets  divided  among  rightsholders  based  on  the 
popularity of their music. In exchange, file sharing music fans 
who  pay  (or  have  their  ISP  or  software  provider  or  other 
intermediary  pay  on  their  behalf)  will  be  free  to  download 
whatever  they  like,  using  whatever  software  works  best  for 
them. The more people share, the more money goes to rights-
holders. The more competition in P2P software, the more rapid 
the innovation and improvement. The more freedom for fans to 
upload what they care about, the deeper the catalog.164
There  is  precedent  for  something  similar.  The 
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 
(ASCAP), and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) collect fees from 
broadcasters,  performance  venues,  and  eating  and 
drinking establishments in exchange for the right of these 
entities to play “whatever music they like, from whatever 
source, as often as they like.”165
The facial appeal of such a system is obvious. It has 
the strengths of  the levy model  mentioned earlier:  it  is 
technology-embracing, it provides consumers the access 
they  insist  on  having,  and  it  ensures  that  copyright 
holders  get  paid,  while  reducing  lawsuits  and  without 
having to tinker with copyright law. It also has advantages 
over the levy model. It permits private actors to hash out 
for  themselves  the  terms  of  a  bargain,  which,  besides 
being likely to result in satisfactory terms, also gives the 
parties involved a valuable feeling of control.166 It is also 
free from the government intrusion of tracking downloads 
or other file sharing activity.
Voluntary licensing is not without potential problems. 
To  work,  the  system  would  require  the  voluntary 
cooperation of almost all rights holders so that end users 
164
1
. RIAA V. PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 16.
165 . Id. at 17; see also Morea, supra note 151, at 236–37.
166 . Assuming the EFF model, the contracts for end users would most 
likely be contracts of adhesion, granting the end user no opportunity to 
bargain over terms. These adhesion contracts would, however, be the 
product of more nimble bargaining among more equal parties (artists, 
record  companies,  collecting  societies,  etc.)  as  to  fee  collection  and 
proration.  More  importantly,  adhesion  contracts  are  widely  used  in 
situations where practicality calls for them and take-it-or-leave-it, while 
not an ideal choice, is still a choice.
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will  experience  broad  freedom  from  the  threat  of 
lawsuits.167 Also,  collection  services,  if  too  few,  might 
create monopolistic problems.168 There is also the matter 
of determining fee proration to record labels and artists. 
However, the music industry has already overcome similar 
challenges in the previously mentioned licensing handled 
by ASCAP and BMI.169
One complaint that could be raised against both levies 
and  voluntary  licensing  is  that  they  do  nothing  to 
vindicate  the  copyright  holder’s  right  to  control 
distribution. To put the matter in perspective, at this time 
copyright  holders  are not  able  to keep their  work from 
being distributed against their will and also are not able to 
get profit from that unpermitted distribution. Being able to 
at least get profit is better than nothing at all and is the 
best  available  option  until  an  effective  method  of 
maintaining control comes along. Also, relinquishment of 
control in exchange for a guarantee of payment is nothing 
new to the music industry. There is compulsory licensing 
in  music  recording  in  the  United  States;  after  public 
release of a song, any individual can record that song for 
a fee paid to the copyright holder.170
All  things  considered,  large  scale  licensing  appears 
highly  desirable  for  meeting  the  needs  of  both  the 
recording industry and music consumers, with the added 
bonus of  embracing and promoting the development of 
technology.  It  promises  to  eliminate  wasteful  lawsuits 
without requiring major changes to copyright law or major 
increases in government regulation. It could easily serve 
as the primary component of a comprehensive solution to 
the file sharing problem.
5. Jambands and Reciprocity
Schultz  believes  that  the  deterrence  strategy  of 
lawsuits  against  file  sharers  is  not  likely  to  succeed 
because “it is very difficult to project threats of detection 
and legal action credible enough to alter behavior.”171 He 
posits that social norms, rather than threat of punishment, 
167
1
. Morea, supra note 151, at 239.
168 . Id.
169 . See generally id. at 236–37.
170 . Id. at 245.
171 . Schultz, supra note 99, at 655.
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account for most lawful behavior.172 Under his view, a part 
of the solution to the file sharing problem is fostering new 
norms of respect for intellectual property.173 For insight as 
to  how  this  project  might  be  done,  he  studied  the 
jamband  culture  and  community.174 Jamband  fans  are 
notoriously  loyal  and,  apparently,  lawful  toward  their 
musical idols.
These fans scrupulously observe restrictions bands impose on 
the copying and distribution of their music. They keep track of 
these rules and make sure their fellow fans are aware of them. 
If they find fellow fans stepping out of line, they quickly scold 
them. They even cooperate with bands’ lawyers to enforce the 
rules.175
Jambands have a distinctive policy toward intellectual 
property. Fans are free to record, copy, and distribute live 
performances.176 On the other hand, studio recordings and 
commercial  live  recordings  are  off-limits,  and  the  fans 
abide  by  these  rules.177 According  to  Schultz,  the 
community’s  pro-copyright  norms  are  not  rooted  in 
circumstances unique to jambands, but in the principle of 
reciprocity—cooperation  begets  cooperation.178 He 
advocates  that  the  music  industry  drop  its  current 
practice of trying to sell collections of less desirable songs 
on  the  basis  of  one  or  two  hits  per  album in  favor  of 
cultivating  “loyal  communities  that  have  reciprocal 
relationships  with  artists.”179 In  these  reciprocal 
relationships,  the  recognized  generosity,  fairness,  and 
commitment  of  the  artists  elicit  loyalty  and  respectful 
conduct  by  music  consumers.180 Community  sanctions 
against renegade behavior reinforce the good conduct.181
The  reciprocity  of  musician-fan  and  fan-fan 
relationships  in  the  jamband  model  is  admirable. 
Unfortunately, that model is so deeply antithetical to the 
172
1
. Id.
173 . Id. at 655–56.
174 . Jambands are musical acts, such as the Grateful Dead, known 
for live performances that include long improvisational stretches (“jam 
sessions”).
175 . Id. at 653.
176 . Id.
177 . Id.
178 . Id. at 656.
179 . Id. at 657.
180 . Id. at 668–91.
181 . Id. at 717.
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modern music business—of which distance, impersonality, 
and  retail  consumerism  are  essential  features—that  it 
likely  cannot  be  implemented  on  a  broad  scale  in  the 
foreseeable  future.  On  the  other  hand,  Schultz 
impressively sets forth an alternative vision for music as a 
business that enterprising musicians may find compelling 
and  may  choose  to  emulate  regardless  of  what  the 
majority of other musicians do.
The principle of reciprocity itself is more immediately 
applicable.  If  the  music  industry  were  to  treat  its 
customers in a way its customers experience as more fair 
and  more  generous,  in  reciprocation  those  consumers 
would likely behave more respectfully of copyright.
6. Digital Rights Management
Digital  Rights  Management  (DRM),  mentioned 
earlier,182 is  a  technological  measure  against  illegal  file 
sharing  that  works  by  limiting  the  ability  to  use 
downloaded music files.183
DRM sounds good in  theory,  but  its  performance is 
disappointing.  To  begin,  DRM  does  nothing  to  protect 
against  the  illegal  distribution  of  files  created  by  users 
from their  own  CDs  or  other  music  sources.  Also,  it  is 
possible to crack DRM encryption schemes and programs 
that decrypt DRM-protected files are available.184
More importantly, DRM endows content providers with 
the ability  to  restrict  use of  their  content  beyond what 
copyright  law  guarantees.185 DRM,  understandably,  is 
controversial. Apple’s Steve Jobs voiced his disapproval of 
mandatory DRM and Apple’s iTunes store began to offer 
DRM-free  music.186 Other  commercial  online  music 
services sell unrestricted music as well.187
182
1
. See supra notes 36, 116 and accompanying text.
183 . Opderbeck,  supra note  17, at 1750. One example is the Apple 
Fairplay system, applied to iTunes downloads, which limits the use of 
music files to five computers and also limits the number of CD burns of 
a playlist. Id.
184 . Id.
185 . Id. at 1751.
186 . RIAA V. PEOPLE,  supra  note  35, at 15. iTunes now offers DRM-
free music for the same price as DRM-encrypted tracks. iTunes Store, 
supra note 108.
187 . Id. See,  e.g., eMusic, Why Join?, http://www.emusic.com/promo/
why. html (last visited Jan. 6, 2008).
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DRM must be effective to  some degree  against  file 
sharing, as it prevents enjoyment of the misappropriated 
music. However, it is only effective with regard to DRM-
encrypted files originating from legitimate music services. 
It is useless against user-created files and non-DRM files 
purchased  online.  Also,  DRM  restricts  the  ability  of 
consumers to make legitimate use of their music files. In 
that  restriction,  DRM  incentivizes  illegal  file  sharing, 
because a user-created or decrypted file that can be used 
on  any  number  of  devices  and  burned  any  number  of 
times is more valuable than one limited by DRM. Given 
the weakness and dislike of DRM, it is unattractive as part 
of a solution to the file sharing problem.
B. AN INTEGRATED, COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
A number of the proposed solutions to the file sharing 
problem have  both  attractive  features  and  weaknesses 
that  can be remedied by other proposed solutions.  The 
best way to approach the file sharing problem is to take 
the good ideas and integrate  them in  such a way that 
they  complement  each  other,  maximizing  each  other’s 
strengths and shoring up each other’s weak points.
A  licensing  plan  more  or  less  similar  to  the  EFF’s 
proposal  ought  to  be  the  core  of  an  integrated, 
comprehensive solution. This model meets the needs of 
the music industry for fair compensation, and it meets the 
needs of consumers for efficient, convenient access to the 
music  they  want.  It  also  promotes  the  development  of 
technology and does not require any radical changes to 
existing law or any congressional action.
As  an  internal  matter,  the  record  labels  and  their 
artists will need to work out a proration scheme, but this 
challenge is  not a new one for the music industry,  and 
artists  and  record  labels  will  be  motivated  to  come  to 
mutually satisfactory terms. More importantly, this model 
is in the best interest of the music industry, because it will 
empower the industry to profit  by meeting a legitimate 
need that is not currently met by legitimate means.
The music industry could form one or more collection 
agencies that  would,  in turn,  contract  on one side with 
record labels  and independent  artists  and on the other 
side  with  end users,  ISPs,  or  educational  institutions.  It 
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would  be  most  efficient  to  contract  with  ISPs  or 
educational  institutions  where  possible,  and  let  those 
entities deal directly with (e.g., contract with, collect frees 
from) end users. In any case, agreements with end users 
should be voluntary for the users.
Lawsuits could still be used against those users who 
do  not  opt  in  to  the  program and  continue  to  infringe 
copyright.  Large  scale  licensing  and  lawsuits  would  be 
complementary  in  at  least  two  ways.  First,  licensing 
shrinks and identifies the pool of users the industry needs 
to  monitor  for  copyright  infringement.  If  the  collection 
agencies contract with ISPs or other intermediary entities, 
those entities could furnish lists of IP addresses of users 
who  are  and  users  who  are  not  participating  in  the 
program.188 Right  now,  the  RIAA’s  detectives  have  a 
limitless  pool  of  potentially  infringing  users  to  track;  a 
diminished  and  better  defined  pool  would  make 
enforcement easier.
Second,  in  the  context  of  the  generosity  and  fair 
dealing  the  licensing  model  would  likely  represent  to 
consumers, the principle of reciprocity would, in addition 
to attracting consumers to the program, diminish public 
hostility to the music industry’s enforcement efforts and 
make  the  RIAA  and  other  copyright  holders  more 
sympathetic  plaintiffs  and  infringers  less  sympathetic 
defendants.
With  respect  to  the  lawsuits  themselves,  damages 
reform may or  may not  be in  order  as  a constitutional 
matter.  The  subject  is  worthy  of  further  review  and 
analysis.  Rights  holders  and their  lobbyists  would likely 
object to damages reform for fear that it would diminish 
the deterrence power of lawsuits. However, if file sharing 
is legalized through licensing, as a matter of reciprocity 
the  resentment  and  rage  directed  against  allegedly 
excessive damages would likely diminish, anyway.
Large scale licensing could threaten the market share 
of  commercial  online music services,  but competition is 
188
1
. Some  of  this  policy  may  not  be  feasible  depending  on  the 
intermediary’s privacy obligations to users. It would be easy to obtain 
permission to disclose identifying information from those users who opt 
in as part of their voluntary contracts, but getting permission to disclose 
identifying information for those users who decline to participate may 
be considerably more challenging.
DANIEL REYNOLDS, "THE RIAA LITIGATION WAR ON FILE SHARING AND ALTERNATIVES MORE COMPATIBLE WITH 
PUBLIC MORALITY," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 977-1007 (2008).
2008] RIAA LITIGATION WAR ON FILE SHARING 1007
ultimately  beneficial  to  the  public.  Commercial  services 
will  not  necessarily  be  unable  to  compete  with  file 
sharers. These services could still provide unique value in 
the form of reliable availability of virus-free, uncorrupted, 
properly  identified  files,  something  file  sharers  cannot 
promise.  They would  also  be free,  as  they are now,  to 
experiment  with  business  models  and  filling  niches  in 
order  to  maximize  their  profits.  DRM,  often  associated 
with legal music services, should be discarded. It prevents 
consumers from making lawful use of their files and, more 
importantly, with a licensing system in place, DRM would 
be  unnecessary  and unfair  to  everyone  participating  in 
the licensing system.
Lastly,  artists  and  labels  should  consider  changing 
their  practices  to  promote  a  sense  of  community  and 
mutually beneficial reciprocity with music consumers. The 
organic  community  development  enjoyed  by  jambands 
may not be practical for most recording artists and labels, 
but some means of promoting reciprocity are practical for 
most  artists  and  labels,  such  as  freely  distributing 
alternate versions of  songs or  songs discarded from an 
album’s final track list, and permitting live recording and 
trading of concerts.
CONCLUSION
The  file  sharing  problem  can  be  characterized  two 
ways. From the music industry perspective, the problem is 
that  consumers are stealing music.  From the consumer 
perspective, the problem is that consumers do not have 
legal access to the music they want that is as convenient 
and  efficient  as  they  want.  The  industry’s  approach  to 
dealing  with  the  problem  to  date  has  been  more 
ineffective  than  not  and has  embittered  or  calloused  a 
substantial portion of the public. In particular, the lawsuit 
component  of  the  industry’s  approach,  besides  being 
ineffective, has proven highly repugnant.
In response to the perceived need for a less offensive 
and more effective solution to the file  sharing problem, 
critics  have  suggested  a  number  of  alternative 
approaches with various strengths and weaknesses. The 
best approach to the file sharing problem is to integrate 
the  best  ideas  from  the  various  proposals  in  a 
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complementary  fashion,  maximizing  each  other’s 
strengths and remedying each other’s weaknesses. Large 
scale licensing belongs at the core of such an integrated, 
comprehensive solution. Lawsuits can be used as breach 
measures against those consumers who do not opt in to 
the program and continue  to  share files  anyway.  Legal 
music  services  will  be  free  to  compete  via  alternative 
business  models,  filling  niches,  and  reliably  providing 
virus-free, uncorrupted, properly identified files.
The  file  sharing  problem  can  be  solved  without 
wasteful, unpopular lawsuits or major change to the law, 
provided that the music industry is willing to adapt and 
take cues from the consuming public. What is in the best 
interest of both the industry and the consuming public is 
to  stop  fighting  an  apparently  unstoppable  tide  of 
behavior and exploit it for growth and profit. The industry 
has  accomplished  similar  feats  before  with  other  large 
scale licensing programs, and it should be able to do the 
same with file sharing.
